Abdelbagi, Costello, Par and the ego problem in South Sudan’s opposition politics

JUBA – Opposition parties are expected to play a critical role in any democratic system. Their mandate transcends holding the government accountable, scrutinizing public policy, proposing alternative solutions, and presenting themselves as a credible future alternative administration committed to promoting transparency, enriching public debate, and safeguarding public interest by challenging the decisions and conduct of those in power.

In South Sudan, however, opposition politics has increasingly drifted away from this ideal. Instead of focusing on accountable governance, opposition actors have become consumed by internal power struggles, personal ambition, and public displays of supremacy. These tendencies have not only weakened opposition parties internally but have also eroded public confidence in their ability to offer meaningful political alternatives.

Self-aggrandisement and internal fractures

The most recent illustration of this dysfunction is the protracted feud between Hussein Abdelbagi Akol and Costello Garang Ring Lual over control of the military wing of the South Sudan Patriotic Movement (SSPM), a member party of the South Sudan Opposition Alliance (SSOA).

The dispute came into public view last week when Abdelbagi—formerly Vice President for the Education and Service Cluster and currently serving as Minister of Agriculture and Food Security under the SSOA quota—announced that he was stepping down as Commander-in-Chief of the alliance’s forces, particularly those of the SSPM. The announcement, first made during a Council of Ministers meeting, was welcomed by the cabinet and presented as a step toward consolidating security arrangements.

However, the declaration was swiftly challenged by Abdelbagi’s long-time rival, Costello, who dismissed the announcement as illegitimate. Costello argued that Abdelbagi had no authority to relinquish command of forces he neither controlled nor was legally mandated to oversee. He further accused senior government officials of exceeding their constitutional roles by entertaining what he described as a political fiction.

For years, Abdelbagi and Costello have been locked in a struggle over the leadership and direction of SSPM. Costello maintains that Abdelbagi was never the commander-in-chief of SSPM forces nor an authorised military leader under the SSOA, the coalition that signed the 2018 Revitalised Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in South Sudan (R-ARCSS).

“Command and control of forces cannot be exercised through unilateral political declarations,” said SSPM spokesperson David Lawrence, citing provisions of the peace agreement.

Peace agreement provisions and SSPM’s position

According to the movement, Abdelbagi was formally dismissed from SSPM in February 2025 and subsequently disowned by the SSOA, effectively stripping him of any political or military authority within the alliance.

SSPM further insists that its fighters are already fully embedded within the peace process. The group says its forces were cantoned, screened, trained, and unified under Chapter II of the R-ARCSS and are now part of the National Unified Forces. Many of these troops remain in training centres in Pantiit near Aweil and Masana Bira in Wau, awaiting deployment orders.

“There are no SSPM forces outside the unification process,” the movement said, questioning how any individual could claim to “hand over” forces that are already under recognised national security mechanisms.

Government intervention and widening controversy

Despite this resistance, the controversy appeared to gain official traction after President Salva Kiir met with Abdelbagi and the Presidential Advisor on National Security Affairs, Tut Gatluak Manime. Following the meeting, the presidency announced that Abdelbagi had formally integrated his forces into the South Sudan People’s Defence Forces, effectively relinquishing his role as overall commander of SSOA forces.

The row further escalated when Information Minister and government spokesperson Ateny Wek Ateny stated publicly that he had “received” the forces Abdelbagi claimed to relinquish.

SSPM sharply criticised Ateny’s involvement, warning that a civilian government spokesperson publicly hosting or endorsing what it described as a breakaway faction undermines neutrality and risks politicising the security sector.

Under the peace agreement, the movement argued, only designated security mechanisms, such as the Joint Defence Board, have the authority to verify, oversee, and integrate forces—not civilian ministers or political offices.

A recent history of SSPM infighting

The current standoff is part of a longer-running leadership crisis within SSPM. In February 2025, Abdelbagi announced the removal of Costello from his position as party chairman. Costello immediately rejected the move, issuing a counterstatement asserting that he remained the legitimate leader and that Abdelbagi had been suspended pending internal investigations.

Costello accused the former vice president of organising an unauthorised faction, invoking nonexistent constitutional provisions to assert control, and convening party meetings at his private residence. While Abdelbagi previously led SSPM, prolonged internal disputes fractured the movement, resulting in rival leadership claims and splinter groups—a familiar pattern in South Sudan’s opposition landscape.

SPLM-IO power struggle after Machar’s arrest

A similar power struggle has unfolded within the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army-In Opposition (SPLM/A-IO). Following the arrest of First Vice President Riek Machar, the party’s chairman and commander-in-chief, in March 2026, Stephen Par Kuol, the Minister of Peacebuilding, declared himself interim chairman of the movement.

Unlike the SSPM and SSOA dispute, Par’s declaration—made during a meeting at Palm Africa Hotel—was met with fierce resistance from Machar’s loyalists. They dismissed the faction as a creation of the ruling Sudan People’s Liberation Movement-In Government (SPLM-IG), aimed at weakening the country’s largest armed opposition group.

This suspicion was amplified by the fact that Par’s move followed his brief arrest and detention during a broader crackdown on SPLM-IO officials.

While the contexts and dynamics of these disputes differ, they collectively reflect a troubling trend: opposition parties in South Sudan appear increasingly distracted by internal power struggles at the expense of their core responsibilities.

Instead of serving as watchdogs over a government they joined through the R-ARCSS, or organising themselves to present a viable challenge ahead of the 2026 general elections, opposition leaders are consumed by ego-driven contests that trivialise opposition politics and steadily erode citizens’ hope for meaningful political change.