From Crisis Zone to Strategic Arena

• Is the Horn of Africa becoming a permanently internationalised region, structurally shaped by external power projection? An in-depth analysis on the internationalisation of the Horn.

The Horn of Africa has transitioned from being a temporary flashpoint that attracted international attention primarily during episodic crises such as piracy, counterterrorism, or famine. It now constitutes a permanent strategic arena, increasingly integrated into broader geostrategic systems, power projection, and security architectures. External powers are deeply embedded in the region’s local politics and security dynamics.

Conflicts in Yemen and Sudan, along with maritime insecurity in the Red Sea, have further integrated the Horn into global supply chains and strategic rivalries. This development indicates a shift toward a reality similar to that of the Levant or the Gulf, where an external military presence, proxy competition, and security bargaining are persistent features of the political landscape.

Countries in the Horn have experienced a significant increase in foreign military presence, security treaties, and diplomatic competition. The region’s already fragile institutions, further weakened by conflict, present opportunities for external powers to step in and fill gaps. Engagement frequently occurs through security guarantees, private military contracts, or infrastructure investments in exchange for resource access, which frequently strengthens local elites while leaving underlying governance issues unresolved.

The density shift: how the Horn crossed a strategic threshold

For the past two decades, global and regional powers have steadily built their permanent presence in the Horn, shifting from mere episodic involvement. This development is not attributed to the arrival of a single actor, but rather a gradual layering of external involvement in forming the region’s political and security environment.

The global counterterrorism agenda defined the first permanent engagements. In 2002, the United States established Camp Lemonnier in Djibouti, its first and so far only permanent military base in Africa. This move signalled a long-term security posture by the US, and the permanence of this base created an infrastructure that others would continue to build upon.

In 2008, the Somali piracy crisis initiated increased external engagement in the Horn. Multinational naval missions, including the EU’s counter-piracy mission Operation Atalanta, began off Somalia and in the Western Indian Ocean. Anti-piracy institutionalised maritime coalitions, coordination mechanisms, and intelligence exchange networks that are able to adapt to different threats as they emerge, such as the recent disruptions to commercial shipping in the Red Sea.

Since the mid-2010s, engagement by Gulf states has introduced another layer. The United Arab Emirates (UAE) in particular has steadily developed its defence and military relations with African states, including those in the Horn. What began as economic investment in commercial ports and infrastructure was followed by military outposts and military cooperation. Emirati engagement in the Horn has positioned the region as not only part of the African security theatre, but the wider Red Sea and Middle East as well.

China opening its first overseas base in Djibouti in 2017 added to the already crowded security environment. This did not displace other actors but rather cemented the region as an arena for strategic competition.

In recent years, the increased securitisation of the Red Sea has reinforced these dynamics. Attacks on commercial shipping once again initiated multinational naval missions. Additionally, the regionalisation of the war in Sudan has seen rival external backers supporting competing armed actors. The result is a region characterised by overlapping military coalitions, rival patronage systems, competing security architectures, and embedded foreign assets.

The Horn is no longer merely hosting external power, its political and security order is increasingly organised by it.

Military presence as political infrastructure

Today, the Horn is home to an estimated fifteen military foreign bases, with Djibouti alone host to at least eight. The bases account for an estimated 10,500 foreign troops and $4.3 billion in military infrastructure investment. This infrastructure offers both opportunity and risk to hosting states. Port development and land leasing generate revenue, while military cooperation supports counterterrorism and anti-piracy. However, more adverse effects such as interference in internal affairs, proxy conflicts, and political patronage are felt in the region.

Investment in port and logistics infrastructure by countries such as the UAE, China, Japan, and Türkiye has boosted trade capacity and connectivity across the Horn, thereby increasing revenue. Djibouti earns an estimated $300 million annually from leasing military facilities. Military cooperation and border security partnerships have prompted diplomatic benefits as well as access to training, equipment, and infrastructure development.

Simultaneously, the presence of numerous external actors and interests further destabilises the Horn’s already volatile political economies and institutions. Investments frequently pursue contrasting priorities or compete with one another.

This dynamic is particularly evident in Somalia, where support from Türkiye, the US, UAE, and EU has been directed to different forces, resulting in overlapping chains of command and competition for resources. Although these cooperative efforts enhance short-term operational capacity, they complicate the establishment of unified national security institutions in the long term.

Increasing external presence can also draw states into wider geopolitical rivalries. The Assab base in Eritrea established by the UAE in 2015 was critical in supporting the logistics of Emirati deployment in Yemen, linking the Horn to external campaigns.

Sudan is another example of this, as it has become a stage for regional contestation. Both the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) have explored basing agreements with external actors to secure financial and political backing. Such dynamics risk turning military infrastructure into bargaining tools in domestic power struggles and regional contests.

From military presence to war systems

Conflict and crises in the Horn have long been interconnected, solutions to which cannot be found without taking into consideration regional dynamics. However, as external presence has become entrenched in all ongoing conflicts, they could now be characterised as regional war systems rather than isolated civil wars.

The war in Sudan clearly illustrates how internal conflicts can quickly become internationalised. What started out as a conflict between two factions, the SAF and the RSF, has spiraled into an all-out civil war with regional dimensions. External actors, commercial networks, and regional power brokers are increasingly tied to the conflict, particularly through interests in gold, energy resources, and arable land. Indeed, without external backing, neither faction could have sustained the war as long as they have.

The case of Somalia follows a similar pattern. Its decades-long struggle as a failed state and inability to install sustainable governance systems made it vulnerable to groups like Al-Shabaab, which remains the central insurgent actor in the country.

Today, the Somali security environment is characterised by international military missions, bilateral training programmes, and regional interventions. US counterterrorism initiatives, African Union deployments, and Turkish security cooperation all function alongside domestic actors.

The Tigray war (2020-2022) was profoundly regional, as allied Eritrean and Ethiopian federal government forces fought against the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF). The war transformed a domestic confrontation into a regional security crisis as it drew in cross-border actors. This raised fears of spillovers and renewed confrontation between Addis Ababa and Asmara.

Relations between the capitals have deteriorated since the signing of the Pretoria Agreement in 2022, and the tension remains a defining feature in the Horn. Ethiopia’s more recent quest for sea access as well as reports indicating Ethiopian territory being used to support armed actors linked to Sudan further illustrate how regional alignments influence domestic politics.

Conflicts in the Horn should be conceptualised as war systems rather than isolated civil wars, determined by interconnected local, regional, and international dynamics. Therefore, broader drivers sustaining violence must be considered in mediation, peacebuilding, and security policy.

Transformation of sovereignty

As a historically volatile region, the Horn has been defined by redrawn borders and violent conflict. Sovereignty has and continues to be contested, and is framed through infrastructure, security partnerships, and external political alignments. State authority is increasingly exercised by negotiating port access, foreign military cooperation, and diplomatic recognition.

Djibouti exhibits this shift by utilising rents from foreign military bases, infrastructure development, and diplomatic engagement. The small nation has turned its geographic position into its most valuable economic resource and political leverage. However, national stability then becomes tied to the priorities of external actors and creates a sovereignty that is both monetised and externally sourced.

Recent developments around Somaliland demonstrate the role of sovereignty in geopolitical bargaining. In January 2024, Ethiopia signed a Memorandum of Understanding with Somaliland that would grant Ethiopia sea access in return for the possibility of future recognition of Somaliland’s independence. This heightened tensions with Somalia, which viewed it as a violation of its territorial integrity.

Israel’s recognition of Somaliland in December 2025 further escalated this issue, as it became the first UN member state to do so. The question of sovereignty was once more at the forefront regionally, drawing strong opposition from Somalia as well as regional and international organisations. A diplomatic victory for Somaliland, and a strategic positioning in the Red Sea for Israel, the controversial move shows how sovereignty claims link to geopolitical positioning and security access.

These developments do not eliminate sovereignty in the region but instead reconfigure its nature. Negotiations over ports, recognition, infrastructure, or security guarantees have become central to the exercise of authority. Sovereignty is now less defined by autonomy from external actors and more by the ability to manage and leverage external relationships to achieve political survival and strategic advantage.

Regional institutions hollowed out

While regional institutions in the Horn have long played a central role in conflict mediation and security coordination, their influence has weakened in recent years. Bilateral security arrangements, ad hoc coalitions, and externally driven processes have become more prominent, creating a muddled mediation landscape.

The Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) has historically been a key platform for mediation in Somalia, Sudan, and South Sudan. However, its authority as a mediator has waned as shown by recent crises. In the case of Sudan, IGAD was but a piece of a wider puzzle as mediation efforts proliferated with the US-Saudi-led Jeddah process, African Union-led processes, as well as IGAD initiatives, all with little cross-coordination. US-led talks, which also include Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE, have continued between SAF and RSF, so far with no resolution.

Regional diplomacy has also been strained by tensions between regional states, as political disagreements have come to override willingness to collaborate. IGAD’s ability to function as a unified political platform has been hindered by, for example, hostility over sea access between Ethiopia and Somalia, and most recently, Eritrea’s suspension of its membership from the organisation in late 2025.

Bilateral or external arrangements have become more attractive to political elites, as they can be seen to provide more flexibility. However, externally negotiated agreements may undermine national unity and often reflect the interests of external parties rather than local priorities.

The centre of diplomatic gravity of the Horn has further shifted by the growing influence of the Gulf states. Negotiations related to Red Sea security, port development, and conflict mediation are frequently hosted outside of Africa, including in Riyadh, Abu Dhabi, and Ankara.

Regional institutions remain relevant, but now operate within a more fragmented and interest-driven security environment.

Political trajectories in an internationalised Horn

As internationalisation continues, political incentives, governance trajectories, and conflict dynamics are gradually transformed. One effect of this is the growing focus of regime security in political decision-making. Governments that host foreign military assets or rely on external security partnerships often prioritise stability and external alignment over political reform.

Djibouti’s long-term basing agreements and security cooperation have bolstered a governance model more concerned with strategic relevance than political competition. Similarly, Eritrea’s sustained militarisation and strategic positioning on the Red Sea have accompanied continued authoritarian control.

This can also contribute to the prolonged nature of conflicts, as evidenced in Sudan, where competing external interests and parallel mediation tracks have drawn out the conflict with no clear diplomatic framework to enforce compromise. When external backers continue to have strategic stakes in the conflict, warring factions have little incentive to pursue negotiated settlements.

State institutions may experience erosion and begin to lack coherence when backed by a multitude of external partners, with support flowing to different units. Somalia’s security sector exemplifies this, as its operational capacity has been strengthened in some areas while establishing a unified command structure and creating sustainable governance have been challenging.

Economic and development priorities are also affected, as infrastructure and investment linked to strategic access such as ports, corridors, and military facilities tend to bring in more resources than sectors related to social development, for example. In fragile contexts, humanitarian assistance is likewise becoming more securitised, limiting civilian-led recovery.

Although external engagement may offer security guarantees and economic opportunities, it also risks entrenching states in patterns of dependency, fragmented authority, and protracted conflict. Recognising these long-term implications is essential for evaluating both current governance and future political trajectories in the region.

Is this permanent, or a temporary phase?

It could be argued that increased internationalisation of the region is merely a symptom of a convergence of crises and not a structural shift. Maritime insecurity in the Red Sea, Sudan’s war as well as instability in Somalia and Ethiopia have all inflated external engagement in the Horn. Attention from these external actors may recede once these crises stabilise. Indeed, the piracy crisis and counterterrorism missions in the early to mid 2000’s were followed by relative disengagement.

However, several indicators suggest the current developments differentiate this momentum from previous cycles. The scale and permanence of military infrastructures, long-term basing agreements, and continued security agreements signify long-term embeddedness of external actors in the region.

Diplomatic engagements also point to longer-term change. Gulf states, Türkiye, and China have all expanded their economic and security engagements across the region. As their strategic partnerships entail not only investment in infrastructure, but in military cooperation, training, and political alignments as well, it is less likely these partners disengage even if conflicts recede.

The Horn of Africa as a permanent strategic arena

External actors are no longer present in the Horn of Africa only during moments of crisis. They are increasingly embedded through military partnerships, infrastructure development, diplomatic engagement, and economic investment. This has significant implications for how political authority, security, and conflict are understood in the region.

Addressing these dynamics requires a shift in both policy formulation and analytical approaches. First, policymakers should prioritise long-term political strategies over short-term crisis responses, with a focus on reducing security sector fragmentation, clarifying lines of authority, and addressing underlying inequalities. Second, external actors need to improve coordination to avoid parallel security arrangements that weaken state institutions, particularly in fragile contexts such as Sudan and Somalia.

Third, to maintain regional ownership of conflict mediation and security governance, regional organisations such as IGAD and the African Union require sustained political, financial, and technical support. Preventive diplomacy is also needed to address some of the underlying tensions in the region to prevent further escalation and spillovers of conflict.

Looking ahead, managing external actors will be central for governments in the region. This includes balancing partnerships to avoid overdependence, strengthening domestic institutions to reduce fragmentation, and ensuring that any investments in infrastructure or security cooperation also support comprehensive social development. External engagement can provide resources and leverage, but it needs to be complemented by improved governance and accountability to avoid reinforcing elite-centred political settlements.

The Horn of Africa is now a region where local and global strategic interests will continue to collide, and a reality that prioritises institutional resilience, regional coordination, and accountable governance will better support stability and political development in the long term.

Read also: African Union Agenda 2063 and the Conflicts Threatening “The Africa We Want”