EXPLAINER | Who are the White Army and what is their relationship to SPLM-IO

JUBA – South Sudan once again appears to be standing on the brink of another civil war, reminiscent of the catastrophic conflict that killed more than half a million people between 2013 and 2018. The signs are unsettlingly familiar, with rising political mistrust, fragmented security forces, and renewed ethnic tensions deepening since the detention and ongoing trial of First Vice President Riek Machar, an event that has reignited fears of instability and stirred memories of the nation’s darkest years.

The first civil war erupted in December 2013 after months of deep political friction between President Salva Kiir Mayardit, a Dinka from Warrap State’s Gogrial County, and his the former deputy Riek Machar Teny, a Nuer from Unity State’s Leer County. What began as a power struggle inside the ruling party quickly spiraled into a nationwide conflict that tore apart the fragile post-independence order.

At that time, Machar was serving as deputy chairman of the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM) and was widely viewed as the most serious challenger to Kiir’s leadership ahead of the general elections scheduled, at the time, for April 2015. Their rivalry, rooted in both political ambition and ethnic loyalties, set the stage for one of the most brutal chapters in South Sudan’s modern history.

When violence broke out on December 15, 2013, the spark came from within the presidential guards in Juba — but quickly turned into a campaign of mass killings against ethnic Nuer civilians in the capital between the 16^th and 20^th. As word of the massacres spread, Nuer generals within the army, then known as the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA), began defecting one after another, first in Jonglei on December 18^th, then Unity State on the 19^th, and Upper Nile State on the 24^th.

The conflict soon became a full-scale war largely fought along ethnic lines — Dinka loyal to Kiir on one side, and Nuer loyal to Machar on the other. What began as a political dispute turned into a brutal national conflict that devastated the country’s economy, split communities, and displaced millions. During this conflict, the SPLA-IO largely depended on army local youth from the Nuer community.

A peace agreement signed in August 2015 briefly halted the fighting, but collapsed in July 2016 when Kiir’s forces clashed with Machar’s bodyguards at the presidential palace, forcing Machar to flee Juba once again.

Another peace deal, brokered by the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), was signed in Addis Ababa on September 12, 2018. Known as the Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in South Sudan (R-ARCSS), it revived the same 2015 deal but added new security and power-sharing guarantees. Since then, South Sudan has remained fragile.

Violence has flared repeatedly in the Upper Nile, Unity, and Jonglei regions — the historical heartland of Machar’s support and home to a militia that has become central again to the country’s instability, the White Army. As tensions rise between the government’s South Sudan People’s Defense Forces (SSPDF) and the main armed opposition SPLM/SPLA-IO, the White Army is once again re-emerging as a key actor.

Who are the White Army?

The origins of the White Army stretch back to the early 1970s, long before South Sudan’s independence. At that time, cattle raiding and child abductions were common between the Murle of today’s Greater Pibor Administrative Area and the Lou Nuer and Gawaar Nuer of Jonglei State.

To defend their herds, Nuer communities began forming self-defense groups made up of young men — known locally as “Bunam”, meaning a war coalition of several sub-clans. These community militias were initially non-political, created solely to protect cattle and villages.

But their role began to shift after August 1991, when Riek Machar, Lam Akol, and the late Gordon Koang Chuol broke away from John Garang’s SPLA, forming the SPLA-Nasir faction after the Nasir Declaration. That split triggered ethnic divisions inside the SPLA, leading to executions and revenge killings, particularly of Nuer officers stationed in Dinka-majority areas and Dinka officers in Nuer-majority areas.

When fighting reached Bor, the capital of present-day Jonglei State, the Nuer White Army — siding with Machar’s forces — took part in what became the Bor Massacre, where an estimated 2,000 people, mostly civilians, were killed or starved to death as result of the famine that followed.

The memory of that massacre has since shaped the narrative of both Nuer and Dinka communities and resurfaced again in 2013, when Machar fled Juba following the killings of Nuer civilians in the capital.

When Machar formally established the SPLM-IO in April 2014 from Nasir, thousands of Nuer civilian youth — called the White Army — rallied to his side, framing their fight as revenge for Juba’s massacres. Although Machar’s movement presented itself as political, the White Army’s participation was driven more by ethnic solidarity and communal retaliation than ideology.

Top Riek Paany, one of the Lou Nuer elders who helped organize the early “Bunam” groups, recalls that he and others merged local fighting units into a broader coalition called “Jiec in Boor” — meaning “White Army.” They adopted the name because fighters would smear their bodies with ash, both for protection from insects and to symbolize their unity and purity of purpose.

Over time, the White Army evolved into multiple, semi-autonomous militias — the Lou Nuer White Army based in Akobo and Waat, the Gawaar White Army in Ayod and Fangak, the Eastern Jikany White Army around Nasir, Ulang, Longechuk, and Maiwut, and Gojaam (White Army) after 2013 in Unity State.

Each, with exception of the Gojaam that emerged as part of the 2013-2018 civil war, originally fought mainly to defend cattle and villages from external attacks — especially from the Murle — and to avenge any raids or killings.

The group’s prominence grew during the 1980s, when many Nuer youth joined the SPLA’s training camps in Ethiopia and returned home armed. They were seen as both a local defense force and an unofficial extension of rebel movements in the area. Even then, internal rivalries persisted as in the late 1980s, the Lou Nuer White Army invaded parts of Nasir controlled by the Jikany Nuer, displacing thousands of families into Ethiopia’s Gambella Region.

For decades, the White Army operated in cycles of mobilization and demobilization — rising during crises and fading when peace prevailed. Their loyalty was fluid, shaped by community interests rather than national politics.

What is their relationship to SPLM-IO?

The relationship between the White Army and SPLM/SPLA-IO is neither formal nor purely ideological — it’s tribal, historical, and situational. Their alliance is rooted in shared Nuer identity and in Riek Machar’s longstanding influence over Nuer communities since the 1991 split.

When the civil war broke out in 2013, many White Army units spontaneously mobilized to join the rebellion and the “march toward Juba.” Their immediate goal wasn’t to advance Machar’s political agenda but to avenge the killing of Nuer civilians in Juba.

Still, their intervention gave Machar’s forces a significant battlefield advantage, particularly in Unity, Upper Nile, and Jonglei, where White Army fighters launched offensives that overwhelmed government positions and creating battlefield and territorial control for the political-military forces of Machar’s SPLM/SPLA (IO).

This informal alignment allowed Machar to leverage the White Army’s strength during the 2014-2018 war, even though he did not command them directly. In negotiations, the SPLM-IO leadership often used their presence as political weight — a reminder that large numbers of armed Nuer youth could destabilize the country if excluded from peace arrangements.

Yet the relationship has always been ambivalent. Many White Army members consider themselves loyal to the Nuer cause but not subordinates of Machar. They operate autonomously, mobilizing through local chiefs, youth leaders, or spiritual figures rather than through formal political channels.

Some of this loyalty also carries spiritual undertones, linked to the 19th-century Nuer prophet Ngundeng Bong, who prophesied that a gap-toothed leader named “Riak” would one day rise to lead the Nuer — a prophecy many believe refers to Riek Machar himself.
This cultural dimension continues to fuel devotion among some White Army fighters, blurring the line between political allegiance and faith-based belief.

After the signing of the Revitalized Peace Agreement in 2018 and Machar’s return to Juba in 2020, most White Army fighters felt abandoned. They saw the SPLM-IO leadership re-enter government while leaving them unintegrated and without recognition. A few former White Army members joined the unified forces envisioned under the peace deal, but the majority returned to their villages — frustrated, armed, and skeptical of both sides.

Recent clashes in Nasir and Fangak demonstrate that dynamic once again.
Tensions between local Nuer youth and government soldiers — sometimes over abuses, extortion, or cattle — often spiral into larger battles.

Because these youth share communal ties with former SPLM-IO fighters, the government routinely accuses Machar’s movement of orchestrating the violence. However, many local residents insist the White Army acts independently, mobilizing whenever it feels the community is threatened.

Even so, the perception that the White Army remains aligned with SPLM-IO continues to shape political calculations in Juba. Officials inside the SSPDF argue that SPLM-IO officers still coordinate with White Army leaders in Upper Nile and Jonglei — a claim Machar’s camp repeatedly denies.

But regardless of the formal truth, their historic alliance means that any White Army uprising is instantly viewed as part of a broader anti-government movement. In essence, the White Army today represents both a remnant of the past war and a warning for the future.

It is a decentralized force — tribal, emotional, and deeply connected to Nuer identity — that can quickly transform from local defense into a national rebellion. Its fighters operate outside formal command structures yet remain tied, by history and blood, to South Sudan’s most powerful opposition figure.