Africa’s Critical Minerals and the Reshaping of Global Semiconductor Supply Chains – African Business Innovation

By Juan Fernando Herrera Ramos

When semiconductor production and strategic technology platforms are discussed, the conversation is usually centered on the United States, Taiwan, Japan, and China. Yet the upstream foundation of these systems, the critical minerals embedded deep in African soils, is no less essential. As advanced chip manufacturing becomes embedded in tighter security-aligned networks among the United States, Taiwan and Japan, African exporters of cobalt, platinum group metals, lithium, graphite, and rare earths face a critical strategic choice: integrate into Western-aligned supply chains under evolving environmental, social, governance and traceability standards, deepen engagement with China’s processing ecosystem, or pursue a multi-vector balancing strategy.

The changes taking place around the semiconductor industry require an analysis on how the consolidation of their production and allied industrial policy could reshape Africa’s strategic mineral leverage, with implications for industrial strategy in the Democratic Republic of Congo, South Africa, Zimbabwe, Namibia, and Zambia. Rather than treating Africa as a passive supplier of raw materials, a forward-looking industrial strategy could enable African states to capture greater value and strengthen their negotiating position in the global technology economy.

Why Africa Matters to Semiconductor Supply Chains

Cutting edge semiconductor fabrication depends on a complex set of upstream mineral inputs.

Cobalt, for example, is essential to battery technologies and other advanced electronics. The Democratic Republic of Congo produces around 70% of global cobalt.

Platinum group metals (PGMs) are critical to high-performance electronics and catalytic processes. South Africa holds roughly 70% of the world’s platinum and significant shares of palladium.

Lithium, vital for batteries and energy storage systems, is increasingly sourced from regions including Zimbabwe and Namibia.

Graphite and rare earth elements feed into multiple semiconductor manufacturing stages, including in heat management and high-precision magnets; Africa hosts deposits actively sought by industrial processors.

These minerals are not peripheral. They are necessary inputs in electric vehicles, data center infrastructure, mobile devices, and energy storage systems, all of which depend on semiconductors at their core.

The Shifting Landscape of Semiconductor Production

In recent years, the global semiconductor ecosystem has undergone a structural realignment.

The United States passed the CHIPS and Science Act in 2022, committing more than US$52 billion to domestic semiconductor manufacturing and research. Taiwan, through companies such as the Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company (TSMC), remains the world leader in advanced logic chip production, with expansion projects costing billions in the United States and Japan.

China, for its part, has launched state-led initiatives to build domestic semiconductor capacity, including the Made in China 2025 strategy and substantial state subsidies for chip fabs.

These developments are not just economic, they are geopolitical. Allied coordination among the United States, Taiwan and Japan increasingly reflects shared economic security concerns about supply chain resilience and dependence on any single manufacturing base.

Africa’s Policy Crossroads

For mineral-rich African economies, this realignment presents both risk and opportunity.

1. Aligning with Western Supply Chain Standards

Western partners are increasingly demanding supply chain transparency, traceability, and adherence to environmental, social and governance (ESG) frameworks. For example, companies participating in the US and EU semiconductor supply chain programs face stricter conflict mineral sourcing rules and sustainability reporting requirements.

Africa’s mineral producers can benefit by aligning with these standards, gaining market access and investment from firms seeking “clean” and traceable inputs.

However, doing so requires investment in:

• Governance systems
  • Environmental monitoring
  • Traceability technology
  • Local value addition

These steps are capital and expertise intensive.

2. Deeper Engagement with China

China remains the dominant player in mineral processing and mid-stream manufacturing in many sectors. Chinese firms have existing processing plants, financing partnerships, and integration with supply networks that African producers have long relied on. Deepening engagement could ensure continuity of markets but risks locking Africa into commodity export patterns without significant industrial upgrading.

Leveraging Regional Industrial Initiatives

Africa is not without agency.

African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA)

The AfCFTA, now in effect across the continent, aims to increase intra-African trade and reduce dependency on external markets.

In the context of minerals, AfCFTA can support:

• Regional beneficiation of raw materials
  • Shared standards and certification mechanisms
  • Collective bargaining power in global markets
  • Integrated value chains (e.g., refining, processing, manufacturing)

For example, AfCFTA negotiations have included discussions about harmonizing tariffs on intermediate goods (like processed minerals) a necessary step to encourage regional value addition.

National Beneficiation Policies

Several African states are pursuing beneficiation strategies.

• South Africa’s Mineral Beneficiation Strategy aims to capture more downstream value within the country.
• Zimbabwe has pursued lithium beneficiation incentives to attract foreign investment into processing rather than raw export.
• Namibia has advanced rare earth exploration and processing policies aimed at attracting investment.

These nationalist and regional industrial policy moves position Africa to capture more value.

Conclusion

Africa’s critical mineral endowment is not a footnote in the global technology story, it is foundational. As semiconductor production coalesces within tighter strategic networks among the United States, Taiwan and Japan, Africa stands at a policy crossroads: will mineral producers capture greater downstream value and strengthen industrial sovereignty, or remain suppliers on the periphery of global manufacturing?

Responsible, forward-looking industrial strategy, buttressed by AfCFTA cooperation, beneficiation policies and selected alignment with global supply chain standards, offers a pathway toward a more equitable share in the global technology economy. This moment of supply chain realignment is not just a challenge. It is an opportunity for Africa to redefine its leverage and future in the high technology era.

Juan Fernando Herrera Ramos is an international journalist and geopolitical analyst based in Taiwan, focusing on Asia–Latin America relations, great-power competition, and the political economy of supply chains. His work has appeared in The Diplomat, Nikkei Asia, The Strategist (ASPI), Taipei Times, and Ketagalan Media.