Can a digital economy exist in South Sudan without reliable DPI?

JUBA – South Sudan is witnessing the rapid emergence of a digital economy built on mobile money, online commerce, and digital payments, even as the country lacks the reliable Digital Public Infrastructure required to sustain it.

Across banking, telecommunications, health, and humanitarian services, digital systems are increasingly performing essential public functions without a unified national framework. These de facto platforms keep commerce and services moving, yet remain fragile, fragmented, and largely outside public ownership. The result is an economy digitizing faster than the infrastructure and governance meant to support it.

On a busy afternoon at Konyo-konyo market in Juba, Mary Akol refreshes her phone repeatedly, waiting for a mobile money confirmation that never arrives. A customer has already transferred payment for a sack of sugar, but the network has stalled, freezing the transaction mid-way. Unable to release the goods without confirmation, Akol asks the buyer to return later with cash instead. By evening, the sale is lost.

Scenes like this are increasingly common across South Sudan’s urban markets, border towns, and transport hubs. Mobile money, WhatsApp trading, Facebook Marketplace sales, and informal digital remittances now underpin daily commerce. Yet these activities depend on infrastructure that is unreliable, unevenly distributed, and vulnerable to outages, insecurity, and political intervention.

Despite these weaknesses, South Sudan’s digital economy continues to grow. Mobile money platforms report rising transaction volumes – despite widespread skepticism – online sellers are multiplying, and satellite internet services such as Starlink have expanded access in select rural and conflict-affected areas. What is surprising is not the growth itself, but that businesses are building livelihoods atop digital systems they openly admit they do not trust.

This contradiction lies at the heart of South Sudan’s digital transformation. The country does not lack digital activity; it lacks dependable, publicly governed infrastructure and digital public goods capable of supporting that activity at scale. Understanding how commerce survives despite these gaps reveals both the resilience of users and the structural risks facing the economy.

A digital economy running on fragile infrastructure

South Sudan’s most consequential digital systems are not those envisioned in national strategies, but those already in daily use. Mobile money platforms operated by telecom companies function as the country’s primary payments layer, processing billions of South Sudanese pounds each day. For many citizens, especially those without bank accounts, mobile money is the only, but not preferable, accessible financial service.

Yet the system remains fragile. Network outages, system downtime, and liquidity shortages frequently disrupt transactions. Mobile money agents say they often turn away customers when connectivity fails or when they cannot rebalance cash due to banking constraints. In rural areas and border towns, coverage gaps make digital payments unreliable even during normal conditions.

“Sometimes the system is working, but the network is not. Other times the network is there, but the money does not move,” said a mobile money agent in Bor. “When this happens, people lose confidence and go back to cash.”

This broken acceptance chain reinforces currency hoarding. Businesses demand cash because wholesalers and service providers refuse digital payments. Retailers, in turn, insist on cash from customers, while users withdraw mobile money as soon as it arrives. The result is a circular dependency that undermines trust in digital finance, even as usage continues to grow.

The banking sector faces similar challenges. The launch of the Inter-Bank Payment and Settlement System by the Bank of South Sudan in October marked a major step toward interoperable payments. The platform enables instant transfers, bulk salary payments, and electronic government transactions, reducing reliance on physical cash movement.

In practice, however, confidence remains limited. Businesses complain that not all banks are fully integrated, while outages and manual workarounds persist. More critically, trust is weakened by governance concerns. Multiple financial and security sources say that key tax and revenue collection systems remain effectively controlled by individuals rather than institutionally owned by the state, reinforcing perceptions that digital systems serve narrow interests rather than the public good.

Connectivity constraints further undermine the digital economy. Internet and data services in South Sudan remain among the most expensive in the region. Outside major towns, coverage is sparse or nonexistent, limiting participation in digital trade. Insecurity in rural areas and along transport corridors has discouraged telecoms from expanding infrastructure, while years of conflict have pushed populations into urban centres, deepening geographic inequality.

Starlink has offered relief for some businesses, NGOs, and media organisations, but its cost places it beyond the reach of most traders and households. As a result, digital commerce remains concentrated in pockets of relative connectivity, leaving much of the country excluded.

Humanitarian and health-sector digital systems present a contrasting picture. The Ministry of Health, supported by WHO, UNICEF, and partners, relies on digital health information platforms to track disease outbreaks, service delivery, and supply chains nationwide. These systems operate continuously, even during political crises, and are often more stable than civilian government platforms.

Aid organisations also manage large-scale biometric registration and digital cash transfer systems covering millions of displaced people. In many regions, these platforms function as the most reliable digital infrastructure available, shaping how people access food, healthcare, and assistance. Yet these systems are largely donor-driven, proprietary, and disconnected from national registries.

Together, these platforms form South Sudan’s de facto DPI: essential, operational, and widely relied upon, but fragmented, uncoordinated, and vulnerable to disruption.

When digital systems are not digital public goods

While digital platforms are functioning, they fall short of Digital Public Goods principles. Most are proprietary, closed-source, and governed by private companies or external actors. Users have little visibility into how data is managed, how systems interoperate, or how long platforms will remain operational.

The absence of open standards and interoperable registries prevents innovation. Small businesses and developers cannot build tools on top of existing systems, limiting local fintech growth. Open data that could support logistics, pricing transparency, or market access remains scarce or inaccessible.

Political risk compounds these weaknesses. South Sudan has a history of information controls, surveillance, and restrictions on movement. Digital infrastructure decisions are often opaque, shaped by security considerations rather than public consultation. During periods of tension, connectivity disruptions have directly affected commerce, freezing payments and cutting off online businesses.

Comparative experience elsewhere in Africa shows alternative paths. Countries such as Kenya, Rwanda, and even fragile states like Somalia have prioritised nationally owned digital identity systems, interoperable payment rails, and open standards as the backbone of DPI. These systems allow private innovation while maintaining public oversight.

In South Sudan, the lack of a national digital ID remains a critical gap. Biometric payroll systems, humanitarian registries, and mobile money databases operate in isolation, preventing linkage across services. Without a shared identity layer, digital systems remain siloed projects rather than scalable public infrastructure.

The economic cost is significant. Traders lose sales during outages, mobile money agents lose commission income, and online businesses face uncertainty that discourages investment. Over time, this fragility risks entrenching inequality, as only those with resources to secure private connectivity can participate reliably.

South Sudan’s digital economy exists, but it rests on unstable ground. What functions today does so through adaptation and necessity, not design. Without investment in reliable connectivity, public ownership, open standards, and rights-based governance, digital growth will remain vulnerable to shocks.

The question, therefore, is not whether South Sudan can digitise, but whether it can transform its patchwork of systems into resilient Digital Public Infrastructure and Digital Public Goods. Until then, the digital economy will continue to grow—unevenly, cautiously, and always at risk of collapse when the network goes dark.