Congo cobalt deal stalls over Dan Gertler sanctions dilemma

A $9 billion deal that could give the United States its most direct foothold yet in the Democratic Republic of Congo’s cobalt and copper supply chains is sitting in Washington’s in-tray, waiting for one regulatory decision that nobody has made.

The Orion Critical Minerals Consortium, a private investment vehicle led by Orion Resource Partners and backed by the U.S. International Development Finance Corporation, signed a non-binding memorandum of understanding with Glencore in February to acquire 40 percent of the Swiss mining giant’s stakes in two of the DRC’s most consequential mining operations: Mutanda Mining and Kamoto Copper Company. Combined, those two assets carry an enterprise value of around $9 billion. Together in 2025, they produced 247,800 tonnes of copper and 33,500 tonnes of cobalt.

Those are not abstract numbers. Cobalt is essential to electric vehicle batteries, defense electronics and renewable energy infrastructure. The DRC holds more of it than any other country on earth. China controls approximately 80 percent of global cobalt refining and dominates DRC mining operations. Every month the Orion deal sits unsigned is a month Beijing has no competition.

The deal itself is technically advanced. Due diligence is underway. Glencore has already extended the operational lifespan of the Kamoto mine into the 2040s through a land access agreement with the Congolese state mining company Gécamines. Orion would receive the right to appoint non-executive directors and direct the sale of its share of production to nominated U.S. buyers. Glencore would retain day-to-day management. U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Christopher Landau has publicly stated the administration is “fully committed” to the partnership.

The hold-up is Dan Gertler.

Gertler, an Israeli billionaire with decades of history in the DRC, was designated under the Global Magnitsky sanctions program in 2017 over what the U.S. Treasury described as hundreds of millions of dollars in opaque and corrupt mining and oil deals made under the regime of former President Joseph Kabila. Those sanctions bar U.S. persons and entities from engaging in any transaction touching his remaining interests. Gertler holds royalty streams on both Mutanda and KCC, paid in non-U.S. currency to avoid tripping the sanctions directly. Until those royalty interests are resolved or transferred, U.S. firms cannot cleanly close the acquisition.

The situation has shifted since 2017, and advocates for the deal argue the shifts matter. In 2022, Gertler signed an agreement with the Congolese government to return mining assets estimated at $2 billion to the state, in exchange for DRC assistance in seeking sanctions removal. Separately, the first Trump administration granted Gertler a temporary sanctions license in January 2021, allowing the transaction to proceed. The Biden administration reversed that license. The current administration now faces the same question.

DRC President Felix Tshisekedi has directly lobbied Washington on the issue, making clear that resolving the Gertler royalty question is a national priority and a precondition for unlocking large-scale Western investment. That is not a minor data point. When a sovereign partner publicly tells the U.S. government what it needs to attract American capital, and the U.S. does not respond, the vacancy gets filled.

Anti-corruption groups have pushed back hard. A coalition of Congolese and international organizations called Congo is Not for Sale has condemned the proposed arrangement, noting that Glencore itself paid more than $150 million in a Swiss corruption investigation into transactions involving Gertler at the Mutanda and Kansuki mines, and that the Kamoto and Mutanda royalties allow Gertler to collect roughly $250,000 a day. The coalition argues that U.S. sanctions relief under these circumstances would reward a system that was already condemned by American courts.

That counterargument carries real weight in a Washington that has spent years building the Global Magnitsky framework as a tool with teeth. Backing away from Gertler’s designation, critics say, sends a signal to every oligarch with royalty interests in a strategic asset that enough commercial pressure can eventually unlock a sanctions exit.

The Orion consortium and its backers are threading a narrower needle. Their argument is not that Gertler is innocent. It is that the DRC government has already moved, the assets have been partially returned, and the question now is whether the U.S. will clear the path to transparent ownership or leave the space to China.

Orion CMC was established in October 2025 specifically to execute deals of this kind, representing what the DFC has described as the largest initiative aimed at creating secure U.S. critical mineral supply chains. A companion deal involving another DRC cobalt project, Chemaf, is also in progress. The framework is built. The partners are aligned. The due diligence is running.

What is not running is the clock in the administration’s favor. Every delay in resolving the sanctions question extends the uncertainty, and in the DRC’s mining sector, uncertainty has historically benefited one party above all others.