What’s next for SPLM/A-IO after Jonglei Governor visits Akobo?

BOR – Jonglei State Governor Dr Riek Gai Kok arrived in Akobo County on Saturday, pushing a long-running political dispute into a defining moment for the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army in Opposition (SPLM/A-IO).

What began as a disagreement over a controversial appointment has now evolved into a larger test of the peace agreement’s power-sharing framework and the movement’s influence in one of its strongest political bases.

The roots of the dispute stretch back to March 2025, when President Salva Kiir removed Mahjoub Biel Turuk as governor of Jonglei State and replaced him with Dr Riek Gai Kok, who is a senior member of the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement in Government (SPLM-IG).

Mahjoub, however, is the Secretary-General of the National Democratic Movement (NDM), a key member of the South Sudan Opposition Alliance (SSOA), which is led by Vice-President Josephine Lagu. According to the Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in South Sudan, the Jonglei governorship was not meant for the SPLM-IG.

The responsibility-sharing ratios under Chapter I, Article 1.15, and the state and local government allocations under Article 1.16, place the Jonglei seat firmly under SSOA. The unilateral dismissal of Mahjoub and the appointment of Riek Gai Kok were therefore interpreted by both SSOA and the SPLM/A-IO as a violation of the peace deal.

This background is what made the governor’s Saturday visit to Akobo particularly sensitive in a county that has long been regarded as a political stronghold of the SPLM/A-IO, and this reflected in the movement’s consistent objection to the governor’s attempts to travel there during the week.

IO leaders issued statements warning that the visit was politically motivated and illegitimate, even cautioning airline operators against facilitating flights associated with the governor’s movements. Despite these objections, Gai pressed ahead and made the journey, signaling that the SPLM-IG intends to exercise full administrative authority over Jonglei State regardless of the disagreement surrounding his appointment.

The governor’s arrival now places the SPLM/A-IO at a crossroads. The movement must decide whether to escalate its political resistance or to recalibrate its approach. An escalation could take the form of renewed public statements, local administrative resistance, or attempts to re-open the matter through national mechanisms created under the peace agreement. Yet any move in this direction risks heightening tensions at a time when the transitional process is already fragile.

Another option for the SPLM/A-IO is to strengthen coordination with SSOA, which is the primary party affected by the reassignment of the Jonglei governorship. Since both sides view the appointment of Dr Riek Gai Kok as a breach of the R-ARCSS, a more unified political stance could increase pressure on the SPLM-IG and bring renewed attention from regional and international guarantors.

The movement may also consider raising the issue directly with IGAD, R-JMEC, and other bodies tasked with overseeing the peace agreement, arguing that unilateral appointments undermine both the letter and the spirit of the deal.

At the local level, the SPLM/A-IO will also need to reassess its position in Akobo. The governor’s presence in the area forces the movement to rethink how it exerts political and administrative influence in one of its most symbolic territories. Whether it chooses to maintain parallel structures, negotiate new modalities for state engagements, or shift toward a more adaptive political strategy will determine how its authority in the region evolves.

The broader political context also looms large. With the transitional period behind schedule and elections still uncertain, control of strategic states such as Jonglei has become increasingly significant. The SPLM/A-IO’s response to the governor’s visit may affect its standing in upcoming national-level negotiations and influence its leverage as the country approaches the next phase of the transition.

In many ways, the Saturday visit is more than a routine gubernatorial tour. It is a challenge to the power-sharing architecture established by the peace agreement, and it is a test of how much political space the SPLM/A-IO can maintain in Jonglei under current circumstances.

The movement now faces a critical decision: whether to confront the development head-on, seek diplomatic and legal redress through the peace architecture, or adapt to the shifting balance of power in the state.

Whichever direction it chooses will shape not only the political future of Jonglei but also the credibility of the peace agreement itself as South Sudan navigates the uncertain road ahead.