Who really controls Abyei? – Sudans Post

ABYEI — For over a decade, the enclave of Abyei was defined by a conspicuous absence of state-level military force. Established as a demilitarized buffer zone following the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) and the subsequent 2011 protocols, this oil-rich territory was intended to be a neutral sanctuary—a “bridge” between two nations whose borders remained bloodstained and contested. Under the monitoring of the United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNISFA), the protocol held, at least on paper, preventing the kind of military buildup that could trigger a regional conflagration.

That silence has been broken.

The current crisis is rooted in a century-old administrative anomaly. In 1905, the British colonial administration transferred the nine chiefdoms of the Ngok Dinka from the southern province of Bahr el-Ghazal to the northern province of Kordofan. This move placed a southern people and their land north of the future January 1,1956 border—the line that today defines the international boundary between Sudan and South Sudan.

While the 2011 secession of the south was meant to be accompanied by a referendum for Abyei to decide its final status, the vote never occurred. An October 2013 vote to advance the cause was not recognized by both Sudan and South Sudan. Today, the “Abyei Box” (a term used to refer to the land forming Abyei) remains in a state of suspended sovereignty, legally north of the 1/1/1956 line but claimed by Juba as ancestral southern land.

This investigation reveals that the physical architecture of the Abyei Protocol is being dismantled by the very forces it was meant to exclude. As Sudan descends into civil war and South Sudan grapples with internal instability, or an ongoing return to civil war, the “demilitarized” status of the territory has become a fiction.

On the ground, this collapse is maintained by three distinct layers of armed encroachment, namely the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), the regional Sudanese paramilitary that mutinied in April 2023; the South Sudan People’s Defense Forces (SSPDF), the South Sudanese national army; and local community militias under the direct command of the South Sudan-backed Abyei Special Administrative Area (ASAA) government.

The RSF logistical artery and armed presence (northern sector)

The Rapid Support Forces (RSF) have infiltrated the Abyei Administrative Area, establishing a permanent military presence that has been confirmed through geolocated imagery and field visits by our investigative reporter between October and December 2025. This infiltration exploits the complex social fabric of the borderland, where the paramilitary force draws its strength from Misseriya Arab nomads and tribal elements of the “Janjaweed” umbrella—militias originating from Darfur and West Kordofan.

Because the Misseriya are recognized residents of West Kordofan with seasonal grazing rights in Abyei, the RSF has weaponized these ancestral ties to embed combatants within traditional migratory patterns. This strategy allows the group to bypass the 2011 demilitarization mandate, masking a calculated military deployment as routine nomadic movement.

The RSF, as early as outbreak of war, receives weaponry and money from the United Arab Emirates (UAE) through Chad and Libya. Following its advance and control of major territorial control for the group in Darfur after the outbreak of war, and married with humans rights violations and war crimes, the RSF’s arms shipment through Chad and Libya faced intense international scrutiny regarding its supply lines through Chad and Libya.

In response, the group shifted its focus toward the more opaque northwestern borders of South Sudan, specifically Northern Bahr el Ghazal and Abyei. This southern route has become a clandestine pipeline for essential resources including fuel and consumer goods to fuel its war efforts.

Using geolocated footage taken by our field reporters, this investigation identifies specific RSF outposts in the Amiet Market area, the Al-Dayir (Kej), and Goli. Visual evidence confirms a steady flow of pickup trucks and light vehicles transporting fuel in barrels through these corridors. This “fuel bridge” is critical for sustaining RSF operations in the Kordofan region as the formal Sudanese state infrastructure collapses.

In Amiet Market, also known to the Misseriya as Suk Al-Naam (Al-Na’am Market), our reporter captured evidence of the RSF’s logistical machinery in motion. Photographed (on November 17, 2025) at the site were Mitsubishi L200 pickup trucks and Isuzu dump trucks being loaded with industrial fuel barrels (here   9°43’14.38″N 28°28’7.11″E). According to two sources at the site, the fuel was destined for Muglad, serving as the energy reserve for RSF offensives, specifically in the lead up to their capture of Babanusa, a besieged Sudanese army military, on December 1, 2025.

One local trader at Suk Al-Naam, speaking on the condition of anonymity, detailed the regularity of these shipments. He stood from a distant east of the loading zone and pointed west toward the trucks that were about to take off north to the Abyei-West Kordofan State border. He explained that the volume of fuel passing through the market has increased significantly since mid-2024 and emphasized that the presence of armed men overseeing the cargo has made the civilian traders fearful of speaking out.

“The trucks arrive empty from the north and leave heavy with fuel. They do not hide it; the soldiers oversee the loading in broad daylight because they know the ‘demilitarized’ label of this area no longer carries any weight at all and the UNISFA are watching because their base is near the [MSF] hospital back there,” he said.

A second source, a logistical worker familiar with the routes, confirmed the strategic timing of the shipments. He watched as several dump trucks were fitted with extra support to carry the heavy blue barrels. He noted that the destination for these specific convoys was the military staging grounds in the Greater Kordofan, which since the SAF takeover of central Sudan in early 2025 and RSF takeover of El-Fasher in late October, became the new frontline. He described a sophisticated network of drivers who operate under the protection of RSF outposts along the route.

“In October and November, the movement increased. The fuel moving through Amiet wasn’t for local lamps in Sudan—it was for the tanks and technicals heading toward the frontlines in Babanusa and Darfur. Abyei has become the RSF’s hidden gas station and this gas is coming sometimes brought by traders from Juba, and sometimes it comes from Kenya and this is just a passing road and the trucks bringing them sometimes stops in Kuajok and it is transported by intermediary to Abyei where they then pick it up or they sometimes designate well-known traders to bring it to Abyei where they would take it from there,” he said.

While the primary RSF presence in Amiet lacks concrete or permanent military structures, field evidence suggests a concealed but sustained armed footprint. RSF fighters appear to operate from makeshift shelters and temporary tents embedded within civilian areas, avoiding identifiable installations that would be visible to aerial or satellite surveillance. Evidence of this presence is visible in plain sight and includes RSF desert camouflage uniforms observed being dried in the sun outside multiple residential houses, indicating the routine presence of combatants living among civilians rather than merely transiting through the area.

There are no indications of active military operations in Abyei. However, ongoing fuel transit activities and the local composition of RSF fighters, including individuals drawn from both Misseriya and Dinka communities, point to a different form of control. This pattern suggests that Amiet has evolved from a logistical transit point into a functional, though informal, garrison. Rather than relying on fortified positions, RSF forces appear to have integrated into the local infrastructure, using civilian compounds and temporary structures to sustain logistical operations while minimizing detection.

A similar configuration has been observed in Goli and Al-Deir (Diffra), where RSF-aligned outposts or smaller garrisons are embedded directly within residential neighborhoods. These positions do not take the form of barracks or hardened facilities, but instead rely on civilian housing, temporary shelters, and dispersed living arrangements. For security reasons, precise coordinates for these locations are deliberately withheld, as the outposts are interwoven with civilian communities and disclosure could expose residents to retaliatory air or artillery strikes.

Local sources further indicated that a significant number of local Dinka youth are currently serving as active RSF fighters, pointing to a recruitment strategy that bypasses ethnic alignments in favor of localized paramilitary incorporation. This integration is occurring in close proximity to international oversight. UNISFA maintains a presence in the wider area, yet the embedded nature of RSF positions and the absence of fixed military infrastructure suggest that Abyei’s demilitarization framework is being systematically circumvented at the community level, with armed presence concealed through everyday civilian activity.

Civilian security conditions

The presence of RSF elements in Amiet and other areas north of Abyei has contributed to a localized climate of fear. The militarization of these trade hubs has disproportionately affected vulnerable groups, including tea sellers and market traders, while eroding confidence in civilian protection mechanisms.

Local peace committee members say this deterioration has been compounded by the weakening role of the United Nations mission, particularly following changes in its troop composition. According to these accounts, the transition from Ethiopian forces to a multinational contingent coincided with a sharp decline in patrols and on-the-ground engagement, leaving communities increasingly exposed.

“The role of the United Nations mission has been completely absent since the Ethiopian forces were replaced by the multinational force,” said Hamad Hamed Abu Dabaka, a member of the peace committee representing the Misseriya community. “The mission no longer carries out patrols to secure Abyei,” he said. “People do not see UN forces moving between communities as they used to,” he added. “This has left civilians feeling unprotected.”

Inside Amiet market, traders describe a security environment shaped by the visible presence of armed RSF personnel operating openly among civilians. Residents say weapons are carried inside the market, disrupting daily commerce and exposing traders to intimidation, including harassment by RSF elements who at times pressure shopkeepers to provide goods on credit or without payment.

“The security situation in Amiet market is unstable because weapons are in the hands of individuals,” said Hassan Ahmed, a clinic owner in the market. “Traders face daily harassment in their work from members of the Rapid Support Forces operating inside the market,” he said.

At the MSF-run Ameth Bek hospital in Abyei, the human cost of this encroachment is reflected in the arrival of patients and survivors fleeing areas under RSF influence, offering further indication of how militarization is shaping daily life beyond formal front lines. Civilians describe a transition from a shared market space to a predatory environment. Two tea vendors, who fled to the safety of central Abyei after being sexually assaulted at Amiet market, provided accounts of the systematic nature of the violence.

“They do not treat us like people; they treat us like part of the supply line and also as slaves. When the soldiers came to the stalls, they took what they wanted—not just the tea and the money, but our dignity,” one survivor stated, adding that children are “still being kidnapped to be used to take care of their cattle.”

A second woman, a tea vendor who said she was treated for her injuries at the MSF-run hospital in Abyei, described her attackers as men wearing RSF uniforms. She said the perpetrators operated openly and appeared unconcerned about any intervention by UNISFA forces. According to her account, the men moved freely within the area both before and after the incident. She added that the visible presence of peacekeepers nearby did not deter the attackers.

“I was attacked by men wearing RSF uniforms, and I later received treatment at the MSF hospital in Abyei,” she said. “They were moving openly and did not seem afraid of the presence of UNISFA forces nearby. Even after the incident, they remained in the area without any intervention. That made us feel that no one was protecting civilians.”

There has been no official confirmation from MSF regarding the specific accounts provided by the two women. However, a nurse working at the MSF-run hospital in Abyei said that the facility has received several cases of sexual violence in recent months, without providing details on the alleged perpetrators. The nurse said such cases are treated “in line with MSF’s medical and confidentiality protocols.”

Separately, medical staff and local sources said the MSF hospital has also treated a number of patients arriving from Sudan with injuries sustained in the ongoing conflict north of the border. These patients typically arrive in civilian clothing and without visible weapons, making their status difficult to verify. While some may be civilians caught in cross-border fighting, others are believed by local observers to be affiliated with armed groups operating inside Sudan, though this cannot be independently confirmed.

According to MSF hospital sources, including a local doctor familiar with patient intake, many of the wounded arriving from Sudan present with gunshot injuries and use language commonly associated with RSF fighters when speaking among themselves. This includes references to “Ashawis,” an Arabic term for “brave men” widely used within RSF ranks to describe fellow combatants.

Under international humanitarian law, wounded and sick individuals are entitled to medical treatment without discrimination, regardless of affiliation, provided they are hors de combat and do not carry weapons into medical facilities. MSF’s treatment of such patients reflects the principle of medical neutrality, even as their presence highlights the blurred lines between civilian and combatant spaces in Abyei’s wider security environment.

The South Sudan People’s Defense Forces (SSPDF) – southern sector

To the south and east of Abyei, the South Sudan People’s Defense Forces (SSPDF) have established a permanent and increasingly structured military footprint, marking a decisive break from the demilitarized framework set out under the 2011 Abyei Protocol. Juba publicly justifies the deployment as a defensive measure, citing the need to secure the boundary between Abyei and the South Sudanese states of Warrap, Northern Bahr el Ghazal, and Unity.

Officials argue that recurrent communal violence involving Ngok Dinka civilians and armed attackers from neighbouring areas, particularly Warrap’s Twic County, necessitated the presence of national forces, but outside the so-called “Abyei Box.”  However, the deployment of a standing national army inside the disputed region constitutes a clear violation of the mandate prohibiting permanent military forces from either Sudan or South Sudan.

South Sudan first announced to deploy troops to the southern approaches of Abyei in 2022, two years after talks with Khartoum over the deployment of a joint force with the Sudanese Armed Forces collapsed. That mechanism never materialized, reportedly undermined by chronic shortages of food, delayed salaries, and persistent insecurity posed by armed youth groups operating in the borderlands.

Local sources said that in several instances, these youth groups were better armed and more numerous than the regular forces sent to contain them. The SSPDF presence that followed was initially described as temporary but gradually solidified into a semi-permanent deployment.

In April 2024, Juba expanded its posture by deploying elements of the so-called Necessary Unified Forces (NUF), created under the 2018 peace agreement that ended South Sudan’s five-year civil war. The NUF comprised mixed units drawn from the SSPDF and the Sudan People’s Liberation Army in Opposition (SPLA-IO), led by First Vice President Riek Machar.

That arrangement, however, proved fragile. Earlier this year, clashes erupted at Athony southeast of Abyei between SSPDF and SPLA-IO components in the wake of Machar’s detention, prompting the SPLA-IO elements to withdraw from Abyei and return to Unity State, leaving the SSPDF as the sole organized armed force on the southern axis of the Box. At least 14 soldiers were killed on both sides.

Based on field visits and independent verification conducted by Sudans Post, the SSPDF is now deployed across a chain of positions forming a contiguous southern belt around Abyei. These include Athony, southeast of Abyei town at approximately 9°30’34.81″N, 28°28’41.73″E; Angok (also known as Aneet) at around 9°21’12.63″N, 28°34’55.07″E; Rumamer at 9°26’33.58″N, 28°39’42.84″E; the Rumkhor and Mijak Kuol areas near 9°31’59.22″N, 28°31’50.93″E; and Doungeb at roughly 9°36’13.96″N, 28°32’48.71″E. Together, these positions anchor SSPDF control over key access routes linking Abyei to South Sudanese territory.

Militarization of local policing structures

Alongside the SSPDF deployment, a parallel armed structure has taken shape under the banner of “community policing.” Originally intended as a civilian law enforcement agency, the body has evolved into an armed paramilitary force operating in coordination with local Ngok Dinka youth and SSPDF Military Police. On the ground, the force functions as a hybrid security unit rather than a civilian police service. Its primary role is to secure Abyei town and provide protection for the South Sudan–backed Chief Administrator of the Abyei Special Administrative Area.

Youth sources in Abyei town told Sudans Post that security within the town itself is now tightly controlled. “Within Abyei town it is being monitored and patrolled by a police force under the SSPDF and the Abyei community police,” the source said, describing a visible and routine armed presence. Patrols are conducted jointly, blurring the distinction between civilian policing and military enforcement. Residents say this arrangement has normalized the presence of weapons in spaces that were previously civilian. Major General James Simon Lias is the Director of Abyei Community Police.

A community police source confirmed that the force is composed of armed Ngok Dinka youth alongside elements of the SSPDF Military Police. He said they are primarily stationed in Abyei town and in areas to the south of the town. When asked about policing arrangements in other parts of the territory, he said: “Abyei though contested is regarded as South Sudan though UNISFA have their own way of handling their report, only in Amiet where Misseriya have their elements as police.”

The militarization of Abyei has unfolded not through a single dramatic incursion, but through a series of quiet, incremental moves that have steadily altered the security landscape. In places such as Amiet and Agok, the presence of armed personnel, heavy weapons, and rival checkpoints has become routine. What were once trade routes and communal spaces are now shaped by armed oversight. For residents, this slow transformation has been more destabilizing than a sudden takeover, as it erodes the distinction between civilian life and military control.

A local source in Doungeb told Sudans Post that interactions between soldiers and civilians have at times been tense and unpredictable. He said SSPDF soldiers sometimes drink locally brewed alcohol known as “aragi,” refuse to pay, and cite delayed salaries as justification. Such incidents have occasionally escalated into disputes, including clashes among soldiers themselves. These accounts point to deeper structural issues within the force, including poor discipline, irregular pay, and weak command oversight.